Como todos sabreís verising ha creado un fabuloso nuevo servicio, sitefinder, que redirige a una web de verising cualquier dominio inexistente que se ponga.
Se acaba de mandar un mail a la lista de bugtraq que cuenta un "fallo"en sitefinder; primero os pongo la traducción y después el mail original.
Traducción:
Acabo de descubrir que verising site finder esta enviado datos desde su sitio sitefinder a la empresa que tiene de marketing ( omniture )- Los formularios pueden fácilmente contener informacion personal. Para que esto ocurra la web tiene que usar el metodo GET. Estos problemas se pueden producir si una pagina web de cualquier site de Internet envía un formulario web a una dirección erronea o expirada. El formulario entonces se enviará a sitefinder de verising. Sitefinder pasará los datos recibidos a omniture.
El mail tiene más cosas pero eso es lo principal, aquí abajo os dejo el mail íntegro en inglés.
Hi, I just discovered that VeriSign's SiteFinder Web site is leaking data submitted in Web forms to its marketing analysis partner, Omniture. Forms can easily contain personal information such as an email address. For the problem to occur, a Web form must use the GET method. This data spill problem occurs if a Web page anywhere on the Internet submits a Web form to an action URL with a misspelled or expired domain name. Because of VeriSign's recent controversial changes to the DNS system, this form data is submitted to the SiteFinder Web site. SiteFinder in turn passes the form data along to Omniture in the URL of a Web bug. The Web bug is constructed on the fly by about 50 lines of JavaScript code embedded in the SiteFinder home page. This data spill problem raises legal questions because of possible violations of the VeriSign privacy policy and of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). As a point of comparison, it appears that Microsoft went out of their way to not receive form data with their Smart Search feature. In my experiments, Smart Search is not enabled for Web form action URLs with misspelled or expired domain names. Instead, Internet Explorer gives a generic 404 error page. Here's an example form that illustrates the problem: /cgi-bin/subscribe.pl" method=get>
And here's what the URL of Omniture Web bug looks like with an email address from the form in it: (link roto)
-S/s07262928512095?[AQB]&ndh=1&t=23/8/2003%2016%3A6%3A20%202%20240&pageN
ame=Landing%20Page&ch=landing&server=US%20East&c1=www.atypodomainthatism
isdirectedbyverisign.com/cgi-bin/subscribe.pl%3Flist%3Dhorsebreeding%26a
mp%3Bemail%3D&c2=www.atypodomainthatismisdirectedbyverisign.com/cgi-bin/
subscribe.pl%3Flist%3Dhorsebreeding%26amp%3Bemail%3D%20%2800/00%29&c3=ww
w.atypodomainthatismisdirectedbyverisign.com/cgi-bin/subscribe.pl%3Flist
%3Dhorsebreeding%26amp%3Bemail%3D%20%28DYM%29&c12=No&c13=00&c14=No&c15=0
0&c16=Yes&c17=15&c22=NOT%26%2332%3BSET&g=http%3A//sitefinder.verisign.co
m/lpc%3Furl%3Dwww.atypodomainthatismisdirectedbyverisign.com/cgi-bin/sub
scribe.pl%253flist%253Dhorsebreeding%2526email%253D%26host%3Dwww.atypodo
mainthatismisdirectedbyverisign.com&s=1024x768&c=32&j=1.3&v=Y&k=Y&bw=101
6&bh=530&ct=lan&hp=N&[AQE].
Some relevant links are:
Data spills in banner ads
(link roto)
SiteFinder privacy policy
(link roto)
Omniture privacy policy
adobe.com/experience-cloud.html
Omniture company overview
adobe.com/experience-cloud.html
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(link roto)
Court draws a line for online privacy
news.com.com/2100-1029-1001081.html
Richard M. Smith
ComputerBytesMan.com
Y no solo verising hace sus "chapucillas" con formularios web, con el correo también, en bugtraq comentan:
<i>More naughty Verisign deeds...
I don't know if this has been mentioned, but any mis-addressed email to a non-existent domain will reveal the sender AND intended recipient to a conveniently placed Verisign SMTP server where it can (and probably is) being tracked.
For example, an email sent to user@yyaahhoo.com (non existent domain) generates the following error:
----- The following addresses had permanent fatal errors -----
<user@yyaahhoo.com>
(reason: 550 <unknown[xx.xx.xx.xx]>: Client host rejected: The domain you are trying to send mail to does not exist.)----- Transcript of session follows -----
... while talking to yyaahhoo.com.:
>>>>>> DATA<<< 550 <unknown[xx.xx.xx.xx]>: Client host rejected: The domain you are
trying to send mail to does not exist.
550 5.1.1 <user@yyaahhoo.com>... User unknown
<<< 554 Error: no valid recipientsVerisign does NOT reject the connection until AFTER the MAIL FROM: and
RCPT TO: fields have been communicated by your email server. See the
following transcript as evidence:TELNET YYAAHHOO.COM 25
220 sitefinder.verisign.com VeriSign mail rejector (Postfix)
mail from:source@yahoo.com
250 Ok
rcpt to:user@yyaahhoo.com
550 <unknown[198.252.172.254]>: Client host rejected: The domain you are
trying
to send mail to does not exist.They could (AND SHOULD) REJECT from the initial connection, but instead
ALLOW the TO and FROM fields of the SMTP negotiation to happen.This means that they can easily harvest the SOURCE email address field
for marketing purposes (no typos there), and would have a strong
educated guess of the correct domain of the mistyped TARGET.Bad, verisign. Very bad.
-Mark Coleman</i>